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RELIGION AS SPEECH: THE GROWING
ROLE OF FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
IN PROTECTING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Mark W. Cordes*
Most discussion of religious liberty, at least from a constitutional
perspective, primarily focuses on the two religion clauses of the First
Amendment-the guarantee of free exercise of religion and the prohibition
against establishments of religion.' Focusing on these two clauses is not
surprising, since they make specific reference to religion-that is their only
concern-and they address two common threats to religious liberty:
government interference with religion, protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, and government promotion of religion, protected by the
Establishment Clause. 2 And, indeed, the religion clauses have played and
will continue to play an important role in protecting religious liberty in the
United States.3
Less appreciated, however, is the critical role played by the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause in protecting religious liberty.4
Although free speech, unlike the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,
is not intentionally designed to protect religious liberty, as a practical matter
it has often done so. 5 In fact, when it comes to protecting a person's or
group's right to exercise religion, the Free Speech Clause has been used
much more frequently than the Free Exercise Clause. 6 For reasons to be
* Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. This article is an expanded
version of a chapter published in The American Experiment: Religious Freedom, 105 (Margaret
Monahan Hogan & Laurette Conklin Frederking eds., 2008).
1. The First Amendment to the Constitution reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 76-83, 220-26.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 15-26.
6. See infra Part 1I.
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discussed in this article, that will be even more true in the future.
This article explores the role of free speech jurisprudence in protecting
religious liberty, both describing how that role has grown in recent years
and evaluating its propriety for the twenty-first century. The article begins
by briefly examining the historic role free speech doctrine has played in
protecting religious liberty through the mid-1980's, when the Rehnquist
Court began. Part two will then discuss how during the Rehnquist Court
free speech became perhaps the primary vehicle to protect religious liberty.
Although the Rehnquist Court largely followed earlier holdings regarding
religious speech, it changed the analysis in two significant ways: first, by
characterizing the exclusion of religious speech from public fora as
viewpoint, rather than subject-matter discrimination, and second, by making
neutral treatment of religion the defining feature of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Taken together, these two
developments made free speech a potent vehicle to protect religious activity
and expression in American public life. At the same time, the Rehnquist
Court also greatly limited the scope of protection under the Free Exercise
Clause, further shifting protection of religious liberty toward the Free
Speech Clause.
Finally, part three will briefly discuss what this increasing focus on free
speech as the primary basis to protect religion means and what role it might
play in the twenty-first century. Part A discusses how the Supreme Court's
recent cases suggest that the Court itself views religion as a full coparticipant in America's public life, to be received on the same terms as any
other world view or value system. Under this vision, religion is neither
privatized on the one hand nor given special constitutional protections on
the other, in contrast to views often advocated by legal scholars. This more
minimalist approach to the religion clauses deprives religion of much,
though not all, of its unique status under the Constitution, but also grants its
full entry into the public square. Part B then assesses how well this
"religion as speech" approach fits with America in the twenty-first century,
arguing that in most respects it does quite well. In particular, treating
religion as a co-participant poses little threat to American values and
political stability at this stage of our nation's history, and in fact enhances,
rather than detracts from the core American values of equality and
individual liberty. It arguably is also well suited to the challenges that
religion itself will face this century, which will more likely focus on
societal attempts to privatize religious influences, rather than intentional
interference with or promotion of religion. Free speech doctrine, which
requires equal treatment, is well-positioned to address such societal
pressures.
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THE HISTORIC ROLE OF FREE SPEECH IN PROTECTING RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY

Free speech doctrine has long played a central role in protecting
religious liberty.7 In fact, religion and free speech have long had a strong,
even symbiotic relationship. 8 On the one hand, free speech doctrine has
long protected religious liberty, providing a doctrinal basis to protect
various religious activities. 9 On the other hand, religion provided building
materials for the construction of free speech doctrine, especially in the early
years of its development: the 1930's, 40's and 50's.1° It is not an
exaggeration to say that religious speech contributed as much as political
speech during those critical decades to the emergence of modem free
speech protection.
This symbiotic relationship was largely attributable to the zeal of one
particular sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, which was a frequent party to early
Supreme Court decisions."1 Pursuant to the dictates of their religion, the
Jehovah's Witnesses aggressively took to the streets, often rubbing against
both the sensibilities of their listeners and the boundaries of local laws.' 2
As a result, the Witnesses often ended up in court, and had a remarkable
ability to argue their cases all the way up to the Supreme Court, being a
party in about twenty Supreme Court decisions from the late 1930's to the
early 1950's. 13 More often than not they won, 14 and in doing so the
Jehovah's Witnesses helped to build the foundation of modem free speech
jurisprudence.
Two cases are illustrative of the Jehovah's Witnesses' early role in
advancing free speech jurisprudence. In Lovell v. City of Griffin,' 5 a 1938
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra text
See infra text
See infra text
See infra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes

15-26.
15-26.
15-26.
15-34.

MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION

124 (2d ed. 2006).

12. Id.

13. Id. at 596. For examples of early Supreme Court decisions involving the Jehovah's
Witnesses, see Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S.
67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Follett v. Town
of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157
(1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Jones v.
City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
14. MCCONNELL ETAL., supra note 11, at 596.

15. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).

SOUTHWESTERN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

decision, a city ordinance in Griffin, Georgia required that before anyone
could distribute circulars, handbooks, advertising or literature the person
had to get written permission from the city manager.' 6 Alma Lovell, a
devout Jehovah's Witness, violated the ordinance by distributing pamphlets
and magazines without first getting permission. 7 She did not deny she
violated the ordinance, but said that she was "sent 'by Jehovah to do His
work"' and that to even apply for permission
would have been "'an act of
8
disobedience to His commandment.""
The United States Supreme Court agreed with Ms. Lovell that she did
not need permission to distribute the literature, but not because it violated
her religion.' 9 Rather, the Court observed that the permit requirement
constituted a prior restraint on Ms. Lovell's right of free speech, and was
therefore unconstitutional. 20 This was one of the early decisions solidifying
the Court's commitment to scrutinize prior restraints, and reflected that
protections against prior restraints went not only to the institutional press,
but also to individuals distributing literature.2'
A second case was West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,22 which involved a state law that required students to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance.23 Barnette was a Jehovah's Witness whose religion
said that it was wrong to pledge allegiance to anything or anyone but
Jehovah, and so refused to participate. 24 The Supreme Court, in a 1943
decision, agreed with Barnette, but grounded its reasoning not so much on
religion as on free speech principles, stating: "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
16. Id. at 447.
17. Id. at 448.
18. Id.
19. Id. at451.
20. Id. at 451-52.
21. In recognizing First Amendment protection against prior restraints, the Court stated:
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily
embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of
liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.
The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a
vehicle of information and opinion.
Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452. In subsequent cases, many of them involving the Jehovah's Witnesses,
the Court solidified its suspicion of licensing as a prior restraint, holding that it will be permitted
only if supported by important government interests and if the permitting process contains
sufficiently clear criteria to limit the decisionmaker's discretion. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and
Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 162-63 (2002); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941). See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 964-68 (3d ed. 2006).

22. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

23. Id. at 628-29.
24. Id. at 629.
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prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. 2 5 With this case, the Court established what is now known as the
compelled speech doctrine, which provides that the right to free speech
includes the right not to speak, and therefore a person cannot be forced to
espouse beliefs against his or her wishes.26
These are just two examples from a large number of cases illustrating
how these early free speech cases involving the Jehovah's Witnesses helped
to protect religious exercise on the one hand, but how they helped provide
the materials to build a strong free speech jurisprudence on the other. In
doing so, these early free speech cases established two important principles
regarding religious speech. First, the decisions left no doubt that the
protections of free speech, only then beginning to be recognized by the
Court in a meaningful fashion, extended in full to a variety of religious
speech activities, most of which involved proselytizing in some manner.
Thus, the distribution of religious tracts, open-air preaching, and selling of
religious literature were all protected forms of speech. 27 To the Court,
trying to convert someone to one's religious beliefs was no different than
converting someone to a political position. In fact, the Court appeared not
even to think twice about the religious content of the speech, automatically
giving it the same protection as political or other speech.28
The second principle to emerge from these early decisions that has
proved to be very significant for religious speech was the idea that when
regulating speech government cannot discriminate against speech because
of its content. 29 Although the Court indicated that government can impose
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech to further
important government interests,3 ° it was quick to strike down regulations
that created the potential for content discrimination. 31 The Court was
especially sensitive in these early cases to discretionary licensing schemes
that required that a speaker get a government permit before engaging in

25. Id. at 642.
26. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 581 (1995); Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977).
27. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141,146-47 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
28. See, e.g., Saia, 334 U.S. at 561.
29. See id.; Martin, 319 U.S. at 145-47; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10
(1940).
30. Saia, 334 U.S. at 562; Martin, 319 U.S. at 143; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
31. Saia, 334 U.S. at 560-61; Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-47; Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452.
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various forms of expressive activities.32 This, of course, constituted a prior
restraint, which is problematic to begin with, but the Court was also
concerned that if the process for receiving a permit lacked appropriate
standards, permits would be granted or denied based upon whether the
person issuing permits favored or disfavored the particular speech in
question.33 The Court's decisions made it clear that the First Amendment
would not tolerate the potential for such content discrimination.3 n
The second of these two concerns, that government cannot discriminate
when it regulates speech, emerged over the next several decades as
probably the central principle governing free speech jurisprudence. On the
one hand, the Court continued to recognize that government can impose
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech to serve
substantial government interests, as long as the restrictions did not overly
suppress speech and did not regulate speech based on its content.35 On the
other hand, almost all restrictions based on content, with only a few
exceptions, were held invalid. This was famously reflected in a 1972
decision, Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,3 6 where the
Court stated, "government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 37 Using this mandate
of content-neutrality, the Court struck down a large number of restrictions
on speech that turned on the content of the speech.38 This was true even
where the restriction was relatively modest and left plenty of alternative
ways to communicate the message. 39 The restriction was still invalid if it
treated some speech contents different than other speech contents. 40
Conversely, the Court upheld most restrictions on speech that did not turn
on content, as long as the restrictions served important government interests
32. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951); Saia, 334 U.S. at 560-61;
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163-64 (1939).
33. See Kunz, 340 U.S. at 295; Saia, 334 U.S. at 560-61; Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163-64.
34. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 284 (1951) (emphasizing that permits to
engage in expressive activities cannot be denied because of disagreement with views of a

speaker).
35. See, e.g., Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 46, 50-51 (1987).
36. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
37. Id. at 95.
38. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462
(1980); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. For a discussion of the content-neutrality requirement, see
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 932-4 1.
39. See, e.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 462.

40. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; Carey, 447 U.S. at 462; Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
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and left ample alternatives for communication. 4
This growing emphasis on content-neutrality in regulating speech can
be seen in two 1981 decisions involving religious speech: Heffron v.43
42
InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness and Widmar v. Vincent.
In Heffron, the Court reviewed a Minnesota state fair regulation which
prohibited the sale or distribution of literature within the fairgrounds except
from a designated booth. 44 The International Society for Krishna
Consciousness challenged the regulation, arguing that the restriction
interfered with its ability to practice its religion by distributing literature.45
The Court rejected the argument, finding that the restriction constituted a
valid time, place, and manner restriction.4 6 Emphasizing that the restriction
applied equally to all speech, no matter what its content,4 7 the Court applied
an intermediate standard of review, finding that the restriction served a
significant government interest in controlling crowds at the fair and was
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 48 Further, the restriction left
adequate alternatives for speech, since the regulation allowed the Krishnas
to distribute literature and solicit funds from a booth within the fairgrounds,
and the Krishnas were free to pursue those same activities unrestricted
outside the fairgrounds.49
Therefore, although the Court declined to protect the religious speech
in question, its holding was based on the substantiality of the state's
interest, the minimal impact it had on the Krishnas' ability to spread its
message, and, most importantly, the fact the same restriction applied to all
other speech, no matter what its content. 50 This was a standard analysis that
had emerged for analyzing restrictions on speech in public areas, and the
religious speech was simply treated the same as other speech, no better and
no worse.5 ' Indeed, the Court went out of its way to stress that religious
groups do not enjoy any greater rights "to communicate, distribute, and
solicit on the fairgrounds" than any other group with "social, political, or

41. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483-84 (1988); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
42. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
43. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
44. 452 U.S. at 643.
45. Id. at 644-45.
46. Id. at 648-49.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 649-54.
49. Id. at 654-55.
50. See supra notes 47-49.
51. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648-49.
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other ideological messages to proselytize., 52 Since the Krishnas were not
being discriminated against, and since the state had a substantial interest in
regulating speech activity within the fairgrounds, the regulation was
upheld.53
In contrast, in Widmar v. Vincent,54 the second of the 1981 decisions
involving religious speech, the Court held that a public university could not
prohibit a religious group from using campus facilities when the use of such
facilities was extended to non-religious groups. 55 In that case the
University of Missouri at Kansas City had permitted over a hundred
different student groups, reflecting a wide range of interests and opinions,
to have access to campus buildings to meet.56 However, university policy
prohibited the use of campus buildings "for purposes of religious worship
or religious teaching,, 57 believing such a prohibition was required by the
Establishment Clause.58 For that reason the university refused to grant
similar rights to Cornerstone, an evangelical student group whose meetings
consisted of prayer, singing, and Bible study.59
The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, held for the students, saying
that exclusion of a student group based on its religious speech violated the
Free Speech Clause, while inclusion of a religious group on the same terms
as other groups did not violate the Establishment Clause. 60 The Court
began its analysis by noting that the university was not obligated to open up
its facilities to student groups, but once it did so it had to make them
available on a content-neutral basis.61 Unlike Heffron, where the state had
regulated speech on a content-neutral basis, 62 in Widmar the university
violated that principle by treating religious speech less favorably than other
speech, which violated Cornerstone's free speech rights.63 The Court also
rejected the university's Establishment Clause argument, saying that
providing equal access to religious speech did not violate the Establishment
Clause, since it treated religion neutrally and as such did not place the

Id. at 652-53.
Id. at 654-56.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Id. at 265.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 265 n.2.
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273.
61. Id. at 267-68.
62. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648-49 (1981).
63. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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state's imprimatur on religion. 64
In one way, Widmar was not a particularly surprising or eventful
decision, since it was a logical extension of previously recognized
principles concerning religious speech. As noted above, the Court had long
included religious speech within the protections of the Free Speech
Clause. 65 Similarly, concerns about content discrimination had informed
free speech doctrine since the 1930's and 40's, and had emerged in the
1970's as the Court's principal free speech concern.66 Thus, to hold that a
university's discrimination against a group because of the religious content
of its speech was unconstitutional was quite predicable and consistent with
precedent.
Nonetheless, Widmar was significant for three reasons. First, Widmar
clarified that the protections of free speech went not only to religious
proselytizing and preaching, activities designed to engage others in
dialogue and thus similar to other types of speech, but also include such
core religious practices as prayer and worship.67 Justice White's lone
dissent in Widmar had argued that prayer and worship do not constitute
speech in its normal meaning,68 but the majority specifically rejected that
position, stating that "UMKC has discriminated against student groups and
speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in
religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and
association protected by the First Amendment., 69 The majority elaborated
on this in a lengthy footnote, saying that "[t]here is no indication when
'singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles' cease to
be 'singing, teaching, and reading'-all apparently forms of 'speech,'
despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected
'worship.'"'7
Second, the Court reaffirmed the content-neutrality requirement, but
did so in what is now known as a designated or limited public forum
context. 71 In previous cases the Court had invalidated government
procedures that required a permit before engaging in speech activity, such
as a parade, if permits might be granted or denied based on speech

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 274-75.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-34.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 269 n.6.
Id. at 267-68.
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content, 72 and had also struck down content restrictions in traditional public
fora like streets and sidewalks.73 But in Widmar the Court held that even if
government is not required to open its facilities to speech, once it
voluntarily chooses to create a speech forum, it cannot discriminate against
speech because of its content.74 This is significant since the role of
traditional public fora, such as streets and parks, are declining as centers of
speech activity, while in the future limited public fora, voluntarily created
by the state, are likely to play the greater role as facilitators of speech. This
been the case with many of the Court's recent religious speech
has certainly
75
cases.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court held that providing
equal access to religious speech, as mandated by the Free Speech Clause,
did not violate the Establishment Clause, even when it resulted in religious
76
Although the Supreme Court had long
worship on public property.
protected religious speech, Widmar was the first case where extending
protection to religious speech began to rub up against the Establishment
Clause.77 In finding that granting equal access to a religious group would
not violate the Establishment Clause, the Court applied the three-part
Lemon test, 78 quickly noting that the first and third prongs were easily met,
since an equal access policy has a secular purpose of non-discrimination
and would avoid excessive entanglement with religion. 79 Thus, the only
issue was whether providing equal access to religious groups would have a
primary effect of advancing religion. 80 The Court concluded it would not,

72. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-53 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 555-58 (1965); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948).
73. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95

(1972).
74. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68 ("The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain
exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the
forum in the first place.").
75. See infra Part 1.
76. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
77. Id. at 267 n.5.
78. Id. at 271. The Lemon test, consistently used by the Court in the 1970's and 1980's to
decide Establishment Clause issues, states that to be constitutional a government act must meet a
three-prong test: "First, the [government] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the [act]
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Although the Lemon test dominated Supreme Court Establishment
Clause analysis in the 1970's and 1980's, for the past two decades it has declined in influence, but
has never been overruled or explicitly rejected.
79. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72.
80. Id. at 272.
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for two reasons. 8 1 First, an equal access policy would not confer the state's
imprimatur on religion since it would simply be treating Cornerstone the
same as any other student group.82 Second, since over 100 student groups
participated in the university's open forum, the forum's primary effect was
not to advance religion,
absent a showing that religious groups would
83
dominate the forum.
Taken as a whole, Widmar reflected a strong emphasis on the need to
treat religion neutrally, with a certain symmetry between the Free Speech
and Establishment Clauses.
On the one hand, content-neutrality is
mandated by the Free Speech Clause, and therefore excluding a religious
group from a state-created speech forum violates free speech.84 On the
other hand, to treat a religious group neutrally, giving it the same access as
other student groups to a speech forum, mitigated any Establishment Clause
85
concerns that might exist when religious speech occurs on public property.
In particular, neutral treatment dissipates any perception of endorsement
and minimizes any primary effect of advancing religion when part of a
larger forum. 86 Yet the Court in Widmar did not apply a neutrality test per
se in analyzing whether an equal access policy would violate the
Establishment Clause, and its analysis suggested that even a neutral
treatment of religion might be unconstitutional if religious groups
87
dominated a forum.
This emphasis on neutrality, though only partial in Widmar, became
central over the next quarter century, particularly in the religion
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. 88 As the next section will discuss, the
Rehnquist Court made neutrality the primary component of First
Amendment protection of religious rights, using it as a benchmark in
analyzing free speech, free exercise and Establishment Clause issues.
Although diluting protection under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court's
neutrality analysis solidified the significant protection afforded under the

81. Id. at 274.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 274-75.
84. Id. at 274.
85. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
86. See id. at 274 ("First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any
imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly
stated, such a policy 'would no more commit the University... to religious goals' than it is 'now
committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,' or
any other group eligible to use its facilities.").
87. See id. at 275.
88. See infra Part II.
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Moreover, the Court's increasing emphasis on

neutrality toward religion eliminated any Establishment Clause concerns
when giving religious speech equal access to government-created speech
fora.9"

II.

THE REHNQUIST COURT, NEUTRALITY, AND RELIGIOUS SPEECH

The previous section showed that by the 1981 decisions in Heffron and
Widmar, content-neutrality had become a central focus in analyzing free
speech rights, including religious speech, and played a significant, though
not dispositive role in Establishment Clause analysis. During the Rehnquist
Court this emphasis on neutrality became even more pronounced, with the
Court largely taking a view of religion as a co-equal participant in our
nation's public life, to be neither favored nor disfavored. 9' This resulted in
an even more pronounced shift to free speech, and away from free exercise,
as the dominant protection of religious liberty. 92 This section will examine
those two developments.

A.

The IncreasingFocus on Free Speech

The Rehnquist Court's increasing protection for religion as speech is
reflected in four primary cases: 93 Board of Education v. Mergens,94 Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,95 Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,96 and Good News Club v.

89.
90.
91.
92.

See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part

II.
II.A.
II.A.
II.A.

93. Religious speech was involved in a number of other cases during this period, but the
religious character of the speech was not central to the analysis. In some cases the Court held that
the speech restrictions were unconstitutional, see, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y.,
Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165-66 (2002) (striking down ordinance that required
permit to go onto private property to distribute literature); Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1987) (ban on any person engaging "in First Amendment
activities" in airport terminal unconstitutional), while in other instances the speech restrictions
were upheld as reasonable. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
683-84 (1992) (prohibition on solicitation of funds within airport terminal constitutional, while
prohibition of literature distribution unconstitutional).
94. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
95. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
96. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Mi/ford Central School.97 All four cases had generally the same fact
pattern, similar to that in Widmar.9 8 Each involved a public school, ranging
from elementary to a four-year university, and in each case the school
decided to create what could be viewed as a forum for speech purposes, in
two cases only for students themselves and in two others for community
groups and organizations.99 In each case, however, the school denied
access to religious speech because of perceived Establishment Clause
problems. l00 And in all four cases the Court said, as it had earlier said in
Widmar, that to deny access to a group because of the religious content of
its speech violated the Free Speech Clause, and to grant equal access to
religious speech eliminated any Establishment Clause concerns that might
otherwise exist.' 0' Although Widmar was certainly strong precedent for
each of the cases, the Court in0 2fact extended the level of protection
previously recognized in Widmar.1
The first case in which the Rehnquist Court employed this analysis was
Board of Education v. Mergens, 10 3 in which a high school permitted about
30 student clubs to meet on campus, but denied permission to a Bible study
club because school officials believed recognizing a student religious group
would violate the Establishment Clause.10 4 The students sued under the
"Equal Access Act,"' 10 5 a federal statute that in effect extended the
protections of Widmar to high school campuses. 10 In essence, the Act said
that once a school created a forum for student clubs, it could not exclude a
group based on its content, specifically mentioning religious clubs as one
example. 0 7 The Supreme Court held for the students, finding that
exclusion of the Bible study club violated the Equal Access Act, and that
permitting the group to meet as part of a0 8broader forum of student groups
did not violate the Establishment Clause.'
Because the Court analyzed the students' speech rights under the Equal
97. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
98. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981).
99. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822-23; Lamb's Chapel,
508 U.S. at 386; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 231.
100. See GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 112; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827-28; Lamb's Chapel,
508 U.S. at 394-95; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 232-33.
101. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831; Lamb's Chapel,
508 U.S. at 395; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 246-47.
102. See, e.g., GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13.
103. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
104. Id. at231-33.
105. Id. at 233.
106. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)-(b) (1998).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
108. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253.
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Access Act, 10 9 the majority did not directly address constitutional free
speech rights as such. 10 As a practical matter, however, the case had strong
constitutional overtones, in part because the Act itself was largely based on
the Court's own analysis in Widmar. 11 There was little doubt that the
Congressional purpose in passing the Act was to extend to high school
students the same rights the Court had recognized for college students in
Widmar.112 This point was made clear in a concurring opinion by Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, that said the Equal Access Act simply
codified what was already constitutionally required under the Free Speech
Clause-prohibiting discrimination against religious clubs on the basis of
opinion also strongly hinted at the
content.113 Justice O'Connor's plurality
1 14
free speech overtones of the case.
In regard to the second issue, whether granting equal access to the
Bible study club violated the Establishment Clause, the Court made clear
what was suggested in Widmar: that neutral treatment of religion in a public
forum does not violate the Establishment Clause.11 5 No single opinion
commanded a majority of the Court on that issue, but a focus on neutral
treatment of religion meeting the Establishment Clause ran through various
opinions. 1 6 Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion for four members of the
Court stressed that the basic message of the Act was "one of neutrality,
rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use
facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but
hostility toward religion."'1 7 Justices Scalia and Kennedy, although not
agreeing with the endorsement analysis used by Justice O'Connor,
nevertheless agreed that the neutral treatment of religion, in which religious
speech was treated the same as other speech, met the dictates of the
Establishment Clause. 18 Taken as a whole, Mergens clarified the premises
implicit in Widmar: religious speech must be provided equal access to
speech fora, and such neutral treatment of religion does not violate the
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 235.
id. at 247.
id. at 234-35.
id. at 235.
id. at 262 (Marshall, J., concurring).

114. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("there is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect").
115. See id. at 248.
116. See id. at 248, 251 (plurality opinion); id. at 260-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 264,
266, 270 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 273-74, 276 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 248 (plurality opinion).
118. See id. at 260 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Establishment Clause. 19
This same analysis was seen three years later in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District,20 when the Court again held
that excluding religious speech from a designated forum violated the Free
Speech Clause.' 2' In that case a school district policy permitted use of
school facilities for various community groups, but specifically excluded
religious uses on the grounds that it would violate the Establishment
Clause.122 A church requested to use a school building to show a film series
on child-rearing, which would clearly have been a permitted use of the
building except for the religious content involved. 23 For that reason the
request was denied, and the church sued.

24

As it had in Widmar,125 the

Court held that excluding the church from a state-created speech forum
violated the Free Speech Clause, and permitting the church on equal26terms
as other community groups did not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court began its analysis with the free speech issue, assuming,
without deciding, that the school's policy only created a limited public
forum. 27 Although subject-matter restrictions are permitted in such fora,
any restrictions must still be viewpoint neutral. 28 Even under this narrow
understanding of the school exclusion policy, the Court said the church's
speech rights had been violated, since denying access to the church
constituted not just subject-matter discrimination, but also viewpoint
and generally
discrimination, fatal to restrictions in a limited public forum
1 29
considered the most egregious type of speech restriction.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the school district's
argument, adopted by the Court of Appeals below, that since the policy
119. Compareid. at 248 with Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
120. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
121. Seeid. at395.
122. See id. at 387, 395.

123. See id. at 387-89.
124. See id. at 386-89.
125. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
126. See Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 395.
127. The Court stated that the church's argument that the school district had created a
designated public forum "ha[d] considerable force" because of the wide variety of groups that
used the school facilities. Id. at 391. This would have precluded even subject-matter restrictions
unless it was "justified by a compelling state interest and [was] narrowly drawn." Id. at 391. The
Court declined to decide the issue, however, since the district policy failed even the less rigorous
standard for limited public fora. See id. at 391-92.
128. See id. at 392-93. See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07
(stating that speech restrictions in a limited public forum must be viewpoint neutral and
reasonable).
129. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
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prohibited all religious uses it discriminated on the basis of subject-matter,
which was permitted in a limited forum, but was viewpoint neutral. 3 ° The
Supreme Court, however, characterized the policy much differently, stating
that the relevant subject or topic for analysis was family issues and child
rearing.' 31 It noted that the school policy clearly permitted use of school
facilities for lectures or films on family values and raising children, and that
the record indicated the only reason the church's application was denied
was because it involved a religious viewpoint. 32 As stated by the Court:
The film series involved here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise
permissible under [district rules], and its exhibition was denied solely
because the series dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint. The
principle that has emerged from our cases "is that the First Amendment
forbids the government to regulate speech133in ways that favor some
viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."'
The Court further held, as it had in Widmar'34 and Mergens,' 35 that
permitting the church to use the facility on the same terms as other
community groups did not violate the Establishment Clause. 136 As it had in
Widmar,137 the Court stressed that under the circumstances of the case there
was "no realistic danger that the community would think that the District
was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or
' 38 In a very
to the church would have been no more than incidental."'
139
met.
was
test
cursory fashion it also noted the Lemon
Two years later, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 40 the Court again addressed exclusion of religious
speech from a state-created forum. 141 In that case the University of Virginia
provided funding for certain student publications, but specifically
130. See id. at 393.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 393-94.
133. Id. (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
134. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,274-75 (1981).
135. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1990).
136. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
137. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
138. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
139. The Court simply said:
As in Widmar, permitting District property to be used to exhibit the film series involved in
this case would not have been an establishment of religion under the three-part test
articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman: The challenged governmental action has a secular purpose,
does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not
foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Id. at 395 (citations omitted).
140. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
141. See id. at 822-23.
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prohibited religious publications from receiving any funding, stating that
direct financial support for religion violated the Establishment Clause. 142 In
finding the policy excluding religious speech unconstitutional, the Court
began its analysis by finding that the university in effect had created a
public forum, which required that any restrictions be content-neutral, which
the policy violated. 143 The Court then proceeded to hold that the university,
by denying funds to student publications writing from a religious
perspective, had engaged in viewpoint discrimination, and its actions were
therefore unconstitutional. 144 The Court acknowledged that the distinction
between subject-matter and viewpoint discrimination is not always clear,
but found that the university's policy constituted the same type of viewpoint
bias as in Lamb 's Chapel, stating:
We conclude, nonetheless, that here, as in Lamb's Chapel, viewpoint
discrimination is the proper way to interpret the University's objections to
Wide Awake. By the very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University
does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored
treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial
viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as
it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a
variety of subjects may be discussed and considered. The prohibited
perspective, not the general subject matter, resulted in the refusal to make
third-party payments, for the subjects
145 discussed were otherwise within the
approved category of publications.
Thus, as in Lamb's Chapel,146 the Court interpreted the policy in
question not as excluding religion as a subject, but rather excluding the
religious viewpoint on a number of subjects that a student publication might
address.147 Moreover, the Court rejected the idea that the policy was valid
because all religious (and antireligious) viewpoints were excluded, stating
that such a position rests on the "insupportable assumption that all debate is
bipolar and that antireligious speech is the only response to religious
speech.' 48 Rejecting what it described as a "contrived description of the

142. The guidelines prohibited reimbursement of publication costs for "religious activities,"
which it defined as an activity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or
about a deity or an ultimate reality." Id. at 824-25.
143. The Court described the forum created by the university's reimbursement policy for
student publications as being "more in a metaphysical than a spatial or geographic sense," but
noted that it had previously recognized that public forum principles still applied. See id. at 830.
144. See id. at 831-32.
145. Id. at 831.
146. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993).
147. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
148. Id.
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marketplace of ideas," 149 the Court said:
If the topic of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of several
views on that problem is just as offensive to the First Amendment as
exclusion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and
an atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or
yet another political, economic, or social viewpoint. The dissent's
declaration that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are
silenced is simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways. 150
Having concluded that denying funding for religious perspectives
constituted viewpoint discrimination, the Court next addressed whether
funding religious publications on the same basis as other student groups
would violate the Establishment Clause. 5' Unlike Lamb's Chapel 152 and
Widmar,1 53 which involved granting religious groups equal access to public
facilities, the Establishment Clause issue here, funding of a blatantly
religious message, 154 was more problematic. As emphasized by the dissent,
financial support of religion was almost certainly one of the principal
concerns giving rise to the Establishment Clause. 155 Significantly, James
156
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
generally considered the single most important document in understanding
the environment giving rise to the Establishment Clause, 157 discussed at
length the particular problem of financially supporting religion. The Court
itself had previously permitted some aid to religious schools when carefully
structured, but required that the aid not be used for religious

149. Id.
150. Id. at 831-32.
151. See id. at 837.
152. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1993).
153. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1981).
154. The publication at issue, Wide Awake, was designed to offer "a Christian perspective on
both personal and community issues, especially those relevant to college students at the University
of Virginia," and had featured articles on a variety of topics, including racism, crisis pregnancy,
missionary work, and eating disorders, and also included music reviews and interviews with

professors. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 826. At the same time, its stated two-fold mission was
clear: "to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and
to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means." Id.
155. "Using public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching the word is categorically
forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if the Clause was meant to accomplish nothing
else, it was meant to bar this use of public money." Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. 8 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 298-304 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).

157. The Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the importance of Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments and looked to it as providing guidance to

understanding the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28 (1973); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947).
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indoctrination. 158 Yet, as stressed by the dissent, the funds at issue in
Rosenbergerwould be used to propagate an unequivocal Christian message,
which the dissent stated was "categorically forbidden under the
Establishment Clause." 59 Even Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion,
acknowledged that the case involved the clash of two bedrock constitutional
principles, one of which was "the prohibition on state funding of religious
activities.' 6 °
Despite these concerns, the Court held that providing equal funding to
religious publications would not violate the Establishment Clause, stressing,
as it did in Lamb's Chapel,161 the neutrality of such a scheme. 162 The Court
began its Establishment Clause discussion by stating, "[a] central lesson of
our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding governmental
programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality
towards religion.' ' 163 The Court noted this principle also applied to free
speech equal access cases, stating that it had "[m]ore than once" rejected
the idea that the Establishment Clause prohibited "extend[ing] free speech
rights to religious speakers who participate in broad-reaching government
programs neutral in design."' 64 On that basis the Court held that including a
religious publication in the funding program would not violate the
Establishment Clause, since it would simply be treating religion neutrally,
rather than preferentially.' 65 The Court also stated that the program's
neutrality helped distinguish it from the Founders' concerns about taxes to
support churches. 166 Whereas those involved taxes "for the sole and
exclusive purpose of establishing and supporting specific sects,"' 167 the
program at issue involved student fees that supported a broad range of ideas
and thought, only some of which might potentially be religious.168
While primarily stressing the program's neutrality, the Court also noted
that not only were funds allocated from student fees, rather than general tax

158. See, e.g.,
Roemer v.Bd.of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 751-61 (1976) (financial grants to
religious colleges not to be used for sectarian purposes); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743
(1973) (aid cannot fund "a specifically religious activity").
159. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 847 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993).
162. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840.
163. Id. at 839.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 840.
166. See id.
167. Id.

168. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-41.
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revenues, but that no money went directly to student groups. 169 Instead,
qualified student groups contracted for services and the bills submitted to
the student council, which then paid the creditors.17 ° The Court stated that
this was similar to the aid provided in Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, in that
those cases also involved the indirect expenditure of money by providing
meeting rooms for the religious groups involved in those cases. 17 ' It said
the same essentially occurred here, with the university paying for printing
services to be accessed by a broad range of student groups, reasoning that
"[a]ny benefit to religion is incidental to the government's provision of
secular services for secular purposes on a religion-neutral basis. Printing is
a routine, secular, and recurring attribute of student life."' 72
A final and more recent case illustrating how content-neutrality
protects religious speech and at the same time avoids Establishment Clause
concerns is Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 173 a 2001 decision.
In that case a school district adopted regulations identifying several
purposes for which local schools could be open to public use, including
"instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts," and for
"social, civic, and recreational meetings and entertainment events." 174
Pursuant to that policy, a local "Good News Club," a Christian organization
for young children, sought permission to use the building after school. 175 A
typical meeting would include learning and reciting Bible verses, singing
songs (presumably Christian), hearing a Bible story, and closing with a
prayer. 176 Although school policy permitted other groups, such as the Boy
Scouts, to use the building, the school refused permission for the
77 Good
News Club to meet because of the religious nature of the meetings. 1
As in the previous cases, the Supreme Court held that excluding the
religious group from a state-created public forum violated the Free Speech
Clause, and permitting the group to use the building on the same terms as
other groups did not violate the Establishment Clause. 178 The Court began
169. See id. at 841.
170. See id. at 842-44.
171. See id. at 843.
172. Id. at 843-44. The Court also stated that "[b]y paying outside printers, the University in
fact attains a further degree of separation from the student publication, for it avoids the duties of
supervision, escapes the costs of upkeep, repair, and replacement attributable to student use, and
has a clear record of costs." Id. at 844.
173. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
174. Id. at 102.
175. Id. at 103.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 103-04, 108.
178. See id. at 102.
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its free speech analysis by recognizing that at a minimum the school had
created a limited public forum, which required that speech restrictions not
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint and be reasonable. 179 Relying upon
its previous analysis in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, the Court held
that excluding religious groups from the forum constituted viewpoint
discrimination and was thus unconstitutional. 180 The Court stated that it
was clear, under the school's guidelines, that any group that "promotes the
moral and character development of children," such as the Boy Scouts, is
permitted to meet on school property.1 81 Therefore, the Good News Club
was seeking to address a subject otherwise permitted under the guidelines,
moral and character development, from a religious perspective, and to
exclude the group constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination.' 82 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argument, relied on by the
Court of Appeals, that the devotional nature of the Club's activities, which
included prayer and teaching students "to cultivate [a] relationship with
183
God through Jesus Christ," made it distinct from other viewpoints.
Instead, the Supreme Court said that even "quintessentially religious"
expression, arguably akin to worship, can also be characterized as the
teaching of moral and character development from a particular viewpoint,
and, as such, cannot be discriminated against.' 84 The effect of the policy
was to exclude a particular viewpoint (religious) on moral and character
85
development, and, therefore, violated the group's free speech rights. 1
The Court then addressed the Establishment Clause issue, concluding,
as it had in previous cases, that permitting the Good News Club to meet on
the same terms as other groups would not violate the Establishment
Clause. 186 The Court began by noting that the Establishment Clause issue
was essentially the same one addressed in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar,
both of which clearly established that granting religious speech equal access
to a school-created forum did not violate the Establishment Clause.' 87 The
Court also noted, as it did in Rosenberger,188 that a significant factor in
Establishment Clause analysis is neutrality toward religion, and "[b]ecause
allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality, not
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07.
See id. at 107.
Seeid. at 108.
See id. at 107.
Seeid.at 110-11.
Seeid.at 111-12.
See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111-12.
See id. at 113.
See id.at 112-14.
See Rosenberger v. Rector& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
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threaten it," the school "face[d] an uphill battle in arguing that the
189
Establishment Clause compels it to exclude the Good News Club."'
Finally, the Court said there was no coercive pressure to participate in club
activities, since the decision to participate was up to parents, not children. 90
The Court's decision in Good News Club, its most recent decision
regarding religious speech, largely reinforced the previous holdings of the
Rehnquist Court: that excluding religious speech from state-created fora
violates the Free Speech Clause, and giving religious speech equal access to
such fora does not violate the Establishment Clause. 191 Indeed, as noted
earlier, the genesis of the free speech rights analysis can be traced back to
the public forum cases of the 1930's, 40's, and 50's,192 and the Court's
1981 decision in Widmar,' 93 which essentially set out the basic free speech
194
and Establishment Clause analysis that was later affirmed in Mergens,
These
Lamb's Chapel,19 5 Rosenberger,196 and Good News Club.197
Rehnquist Court cases, therefore, did not so much take the Court in a new
direction as affirm and solidify earlier doctrine and analysis.
In two important respects, however, the Rehnquist Court took religious
speech rights a step further and strengthened the protection given to
religious speech. First, whereas Widmar had treated the exclusion of
religious speech as content-discrimination, 198 the Court in Lamb 's Chapel,
Rosenberger, and Good News Club characterized it as viewpoint
discrimination, a much more problematic form of speech discrimination,
and one that is almost inevitably unconstitutional. 99 It is important to
189. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114.
190. See id. at 115.
191. See id. at 120.
192. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 396-97 (1953); Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 269, 271-72 (1951); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502, 504-05 (1946);
Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 520 (1946); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576-77
(1944); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589-90 (1943); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141-42 (1943); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 161-62
(1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943);
Jones v. City ofOpelika, 316 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 571
(1941); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
193. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-77 (1981).
194. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
195. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-95 (1993).
196. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-46 (1995).
197. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001).
198. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-77.
199. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07, 109-10; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-31;
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emphasize how significant this characterization is. Although any type of
content discrimination is problematic, the Court has stressed that viewpoint
2 00
discrimination is a particularly troublesome type of discrimination.
Professor Rodney Smolla puts it this way in his treatise: "The doctrinal
difference between content-based discrimination and viewpoint-based
discrimination is certainly significant.
Content-based discrimination
normally triggers strict scrutiny (or some other form of heightened
scrutiny), often resulting in the law being held unconstitutional. Laws that
engage in viewpoint discrimination have even tougher going."20' The Court
in Rosenberger made this same point, stating that "[w]hen the government
targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a
subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant," and
labeling viewpoint discrimination "an egregious form of content
discrimination. 2 2
Thus, it is no small matter that the Court in these cases began
characterizing the exclusion of religious speech as not just exclusion of
religion as a category of speech, but rather as exclusion of religious
viewpoints on a variety of broader social issues. The Rehnquist Court made
that change by viewing each of the fora in question as addressing particular
social issues, but excluding the religious viewpoint in each. In Lamb's
Chapel it was discussion of child-rearing,203 in Rosenberger it was a variety
of political and social issues, 2° 4 and in Good News Club it was character and
moral development. 20 5 Thus, what might be superficially seen as merely
excluding a particular speech content-religion-was reconceptualized as
exclusion of particular viewpoints-religious--on a broad set of issues
addressing society. The consequence was to provide an even greater level
of protection to religious speech than had previously existed.
The second way in which the Rehnquist Court solidified the use of free
speech to protect religion was in how it handled the Establishment Clause
issue that is inevitably presented in these types of cases. What was implicit
in Widmar, that the neutral treatment of religion would not violate the
Establishment Clause, 6 became more overt in the Rehnquist Court years.
Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 393-94.
200. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Cornmc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
201.

RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3.11 (2008).

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387.
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825-27.
See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108.
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
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All four cases-Mergens, Lamb's Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News
Club-emphasized that neutral treatment of religious speech mitigates any
Establishment Clause concerns. 0 7
This was particularly true in
Rosenberger and Good News Club, where the Court made neutrality the
central factor in its analysis and which almost, but not quite, guarantees the
Establishment Clause is not violated if religion is treated the same as other
speech, no better and no worse.20 8
Perhaps even more significant, however, were the fact patterns in those
last two cases, which involved areas in which the Court had often closely
scrutinized government involvement with religion. In Rosenberger this
involved use of government monies to fund an overt, even blatant religious
message.20 9 In Good News Club it was overtly religious activity, such as
prayer and Bible study, in the context of an elementary school, 210 where
students are the most impressionable. Both of these are highly sensitive
Establishment Clause areas, in which both historical understandings and the
Court's own jurisprudence suggest any government association with
religious activity should be closely scrutinized. 21 ' Yet in both of these
contexts the Court essentially said the neutral treatment of religion, as
required by12the Free Speech Clause, would trump any Establishment Clause
2
concerns.
In sum, the Rehnquist Court increasingly relied on free speech
principles to provide protection to religious liberty under the increasingly
powerful concept of neutrality. Religion was certainly not given any
preferred status under the Free Speech Clause, but it became clear it could
not be given less.213 This became particularly important as the exercise of
religious speech shifted to contexts that began to present legitimate, and in
some instances significant, Establishment Clause concerns. 2 4
The
neutrality and equal treatment mandated by free speech also mitigated any
Establishment Clause concerns that might exist, creating
a nice symmetry
21 5
between the two clauses in regard to religious speech.
207. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839; Lamb's Chapel,
508 U.S. at 395; Bd. ofEduc. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990).
208. See GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 114; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.

209. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823-24.
210. See GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 102-03.
211. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) ("The Court has been particularly

vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary
schools.").
212. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.
213. See supra Part l.A.
214. See supra Part II.A.
215. See supra Part II.A.
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Finally, in order to appreciate fully the ascendancy of free speech
protection for religious liberty, attention should be paid to what was
happening to free exercise protection during this period. Neutrality was
also emerging as a powerful concept here, but with the opposite result;
rather than strengthening protection under the Free Exercise Clause, it came
close to eliminating it.2 16
The next subsection will examine this
development, first briefly discussing the Court's earlier development of free
exercise doctrine, and then examining the Rehnquist Court's change of
direction.

B.

The Demise of FreeExercise

The Free Exercise Clause, though never being relied upon as much as
the Free Speech Clause to protect religious liberty, still emerged during the
mid-twentieth century as a significant source of protection for religious
freedom distinct from free speech.217 Indeed, for nearly three decades the
Supreme Court articulated a Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence which, at
least in theory, provided significant and unique protection for religious
rights.218 This was substantially changed during the Rehnquist Court years,
with the Court largely rejecting its prior
analysis
•
•
219 and greatly limiting the
reach and significance of free exercise protection.
One of the Court's earliest Free Exercise Clause cases, Reynolds v.
United States,220 did not suggest a particularly expansive protection for
religious liberty. In that case the Court examined whether a federal law
making polygamy a crime violated the free exercise rights of Mormons,
whose religion mandated polygamy as a practice.221 In rejecting the claim,
the Court stated that the law itself was valid and supported by strong public
policy, 222 and thus the only issue was whether the Mormons' religious
beliefs exempted them from the law.223 The Court said no, drawing a basic
distinction between actions, which can be regulated, and beliefs, which

216. See infra Part II.B.
217. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
218. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 234-60.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 261-83.
220. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
221. Id. at 161-62.
222. See id. at 166-67. The Court stated that polygamy "had always been odious" to Western
nations of Europe and considered an offense against society and prohibited by law. Id. at 164-65.
223. Id. at 166.
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government cannot interfere with.224 To hold otherwise would "permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself, ' 225 leading to chaos. Although
not saying how far this belief/conduct distinction should be pushed, the tone
of the opinion suggested very little or no protection for religious
practices
226
policy.
public
perceived
to
contrary
when
least
at
themselves,
By the 1940's, however, the Court began to indicate that religious acts
and practices were also subject to some, though not complete, protection
under the Free Exercise Clause. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,227 in which the
Court first incorporated the Free Exercise Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment,228 it reiterated the belief/conduct distinction laid out in
Reynolds, stating: "[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the
2 29
protection of society. Q
The Court proceeded to state, however, that government's ability to
regulate conduct was not absolute, and must be exercised so as not "unduly
to infringe the protected freedom., 230 For example, the Court said that it
clearly was unconstitutional to deny the "right to preach or to disseminate
religious views.",23 1 On the other hand, the state can put reasonable time,
232
place, and manner restrictions on the use of streets for religious activities.
Although not clarifying how free exercise protection would differ from that
available under free speech, the Court did233make clear that free exercise
rights extended to conduct as well as belief.
Free Exercise Clause analysis came into its own, however, in Sherbert
v. Verner,234 a 1963 decision, in which the Court established a unique and
potentially powerful free exercise analysis. In Sherbert, the Court reviewed
a South Carolina statute that denied unemployment benefits to a Seventhday Adventist because she refused to work on Saturday due to her religious

224. See id. at 166 ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.").
225. Id.
226. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
227. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
228. Id. at 303.
229. Id. at 303-04.
230. Id. at 304 ("In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.").
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
234. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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beliefs. 5 In finding the denial of benefits unconstitutional, the Court
revealed a two-step analysis for resolving free exercise questions. 236 First, a
court must determine whether the government is in fact infringing upon a
person's free exercise right. 237 Second, if such rights are in fact infringed,
then the action is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring that the infringement is
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. 238
In finding that the denial of benefits in Sherbert did in fact infringe the
claimant's free exercise rights, the Court focused on the coercive effect the
denial placed on the claimant to abandon a cardinal tenet of her religion.239
The Court emphasized that the claimant's ineligibility for benefits derived
"solely from the practice of her religion, ' 240 suggesting that she, in effect,
was being penalized for her religious beliefs. As the Court noted, the law
forced the claimant to choose between her religion and receiving important
government benefits, placing the same kind of burden on her beliefs as a
direct prohibition would. 24t The state failed to establish a compelling
interest sufficient to justify this infringement, since the state's asserted
interest in avoiding false claims by those "feigning religious objections to
Saturday work" lacked any proof of an actual problem.242 Moreover, even
if such proof existed, the state would still have to show that no alternative
means of addressing the possibility of fraud existed, which it failed to do.243
The free exercise analysis established in Sherbert was significant in
several respects. First, it made clear that even neutral and general laws not
focused on religion trigger free exercise concerns if the law, as applied to a
particular person, imposes a significant burden on religious exercise,
triggering heightened scrutiny.24 Second, in applying strict scrutiny, the
Court's analysis indicated that the issue in the case was not the importance
of the overall state program, including the requirement that claimants be
willing to work on Saturdays, but rather whether the state must grant an
235. Id. at 399-400. To qualify for unemployment compensation, an applicant had to be able

to and available for work, and accept suitable work when offered by the unemployment office or
an employer. Id. at 400-01.
236. See id. at 403.
237. See id.

238. See id.
239. Id. at 404.
240. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
241. See id. at 403-04. The Court also rejected the argument that the Constitution was not
violated because unemployment benefits are not a "'right,' but merely a 'privilege,"' stating, "It is
too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." Id. at 404.
242. See id. at 407.
243. See id. at 406-07.
244. See id. at 406.
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exemption from such a requirement to those with religious burdens.245 The
effect was to require exemptions for religious adherents whose beliefs
would be substantially burdened by a law, the very thing that the Court in
Reynolds characterized as unworkable.246 The Court in Sherbert also
rejected the argument that granting such exemptions would violate the
Establishment Clause, stating that it "reflects nothing more than the
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences. 24 7
Over the next three decades the Court applied and refined the two-step
Free Exercise Clause analysis of Sherbert in a number of cases, perhaps
most notably in Wisconsin v. Yoder.248 There the Court held that
Wisconsin's compulsory education law, which required school attendance
until sixteen, violated the rights of the Amish, whose religion prohibited
attending school after eighth grade.249 In finding the law unconstitutional as
applied to the Amish, the Court engaged in Sherbert's two-step analysis,
although doing it in a way that involved balancing the respective interests at
stake.25 ° It began by examining the impact of Wisconsin's compulsory
education law on Amish faith, concluding that it imposed a substantial
burden on a core religious belief.251 It then assessed whether the state was
justified in applying the law to the Amish, stating that only an overriding
interest would justify an infringement of free exercise rights.252 The Court
proceeded to compare the state's interest in requiring additional schooling
for the Amish (which was minimal) against the burden imposed on the
Amish religion (which was substantial),2 53 concluding that the law as
245. Id.
246. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
247. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409.
248. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
249. Id. at 218-19.
250. Id. at214.
251. Seeid.at215-19.
252. The Court made clear that it was not enough to show a compelling interest in compulsory
education in general, but once a substantial burden on religion was shown, then the state must
show a compelling interest in applying the law to the Amish:
We turn, then, to the State's broader contention that its interest in its system of compulsory
education is so compelling that even the established religious practices of the Amish must
give way. Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, we cannot
accept such a sweeping claim; despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must
searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for
compulsory education to age 16, and the impediment to those objectives that would flow
from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption.
Id. at 221.
253. See id. at 214 ("a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as
those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment").
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applied to the Amish was unconstitutional.2 4
Yoder therefore refined the Sherbert analysis by introducing an element
of balancing in determining whether the law should be applied to a religious
adherent, an element found in subsequent free exercise decisions.255 Yet
Yoder and other decisions confirmed the basic analysis set out in Sherbert,
in which once it was shown that a government act imposes a substantial
burden on religious exercise, then the state must demonstrate an
"overriding" interest in applying the law to the religious adherent;
otherwise, an exemption must be granted.256 The Court often found the
state had a compelling or overriding interest in not exempting the burdened
religious adherent,257 leading some to observe that the heightened free
exercise protection was more theoretical than real.258 But despite the results
of some decisions, the analytical framework constructed and followed by
the Court during this period applied to any law that imposed a significant
burden on religious exercise, even if only incidental to the law's purpose. 259
Even such incidental burdens on religion triggered heightened, and at times,
rigorous scrutiny.26 °
This standard of free exercise analysis for any substantial burden on
religion came to an abrupt, and to most people, surprising end in
Employment Division v. Smith,26 ' a 1990 decision. In that case two Native
Americans had ingested peyote as part of a religious observance at their
254. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
255. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) ("The state may justify a
limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding
governmental interest.").
256. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986); Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58; Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
257. See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-60.
258. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of
Religious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REv. 651, 684 (1991) ("This major change in free exercise
protection [after Smith, see infra text accompanying notes 261-71,] will probably have little effect
upon future results in the Supreme Court, because despite its former doctrine, the Court generally
did not protect free exercise interests significantly. But Smith will have a major impact upon the
disposition of free exercise claims in the lower federal and state courts, which were taking the
compelling government interest test seriously and requiring exemptions for religious activities in a
substantial number of case each year."); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cit. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1990).
259. For example, the Court in Yoder was very specific that even "regulations of general
applicability" and a regulation "neutral on its face" might so burden religion so as to constitute a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
260. See, e.g., id. at 220-21.
261. 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990), reh 'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated by
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997).
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Native American church.2 62 Use of peyote was illegal under Oregon law,
and as a result the two men were fired from their jobs as counselors at a
private drug rehabilitation center.2 63 They were subsequently deemed
ineligible for unemployment benefits, since they had been discharged for
work-related misconduct.2 4 The two men challenged the denial of benefits
under the Free Exercise Clause, arguing that as applied to them it imposed a
substantial burden on their religious exercise, since peyote use served
sacramental purposes at their church.2 65 Further, they argued the state
lacked a compelling interest in not granting them an exemption. 266
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the law did not violate
the Free Exercise rights of the claimants, articulating an analysis that, at
least facially, changed and greatly limited the reach of free exercise
6
protection. 267
The Court began by recognizing the noncontroversial
proposition that the First Amendment prohibits "governmental regulation of
religious beliefs as such., 268 When it comes to religious conduct, however,
the Court in Smith drew a fundamental distinction between laws that
specifically target religion, which are subject to strict scrutiny, and neutral
laws of general applicability that have an incidental burden on religion.2 69
According to the Court, the latter category never constitute an infringement
of free exercise, no matter how substantial the burden on religious
exercise. 270 In particular, the Court stated that the Free Exercise Clause
"does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
or
27
(prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'", 1
The Court acknowledged that in some cases it had applied strict
scrutiny to burdens on religion incidental to general laws, thus requiring an
exemption, but it distinguished those as special situations.2 72 It stated that
Yoder had involved a "hybrid situation" in which free exercise concerns
were reinforced by the substantive due process rights of parents to raise

262. See id. at 874.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 882-83.
266. Id.
267. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
268. Id. at 877.
269. Id. at 877-79.
270. Id. at 878-79.
271. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
272. Seeid.at881.
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their children.2 73 Similarly, it distinguished Sherbert and similar cases that
involved unemployment compensation schemes, saying that since such
schemes already provided for individualized assessment of applicants, the
Free Exercise Clause requires that burdens on religion also be considered.274
But in the typical instance of neutral laws of general applicability, the Court
said the Free Exercise Clause by itself is not implicated by incidental
burdens on religion, or even substantial ones.275 Echoing concerns
expressed in Reynolds more than a century earlier, the Court said that any
other approach "would be courting anarchy" and give rise to a host of
practical problems. 276 Since the case before it concerned a neutral and
generally applicable law, and did not involve either of the exceptions
recognized by the Court, the Court held there was no free exercise
infringement.27 7
Despite its efforts to distinguish Yoder, Sherbert, and other free
exercise cases, it was clear that the majority in Smith substantially changed,
and greatly restricted, prior free exercise doctrine, a point emphasized by
both Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion 278 and the dissenting
273. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. The Court noted that in Yoder it had not only discussed
Amish free exercise rights, but had also recognized the substantive due process rights of parents
"to direct the religious upbringing of their children," first recognized in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), with the Court in Yoder specifically linking the two. See id.
at 881 n. 1; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) ("when the interests of parenthood are
combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a
'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required to sustain the
validity of the State's requirement under the First Amendment.").
The Court also stated that the free exercise claim in Cantwell was tied to the free speech
claims present in the case, and noted that a number of other cases involving religious freedom
were decided solely on free speech grounds. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
274. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-85. The Court stated that "[t]he Sherbert test, it must be
recalled, was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of
the reasons for the relevant conduct ... a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation
programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind
an applicant's unemployment .... " Id. at 884.
275. Id. at 884-86.
276. Id. at 888. The Court stated:
Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in
direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce
or suppress none of them. Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of
people of almost every conceivable religious preference," and precisely because we value
and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively
invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect
an interest of the highest order.
Id. (citation omitted).
277. Id. at 882.
278. Justice O'Connor explicitly rejected the majority's analysis, stating that it "misreads
settled First Amendment precedent" and fails to give any "convincing reason to depart from
settled First Amendment jurisprudence." Smith, 494 U.S. at 901, 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
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opinions.2 79 Unless a claimant fits into one of the two narrow exceptions
recognized by the Court, there is no free exercise right for burdens imposed
by neutral and generally applicable laws.280 Instead, any accommodation of
unique burdens on religious exercise must occur at the political, not the
constitutional level, a point made by the majority. 28 1 The Free Exercise
Clause itself is limited to those rare instances where government
intentionally targets religion with unique burdens or prohibitions.282 The
neutral treatment of religion, even if it incidentally imposes significant
burdens on religious exercise, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.283
In a sense, the Smith Court's paramount focus on neutrality in free
exercise analysis was the mirror image of what was happening with
religious rights under free speech and Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.2 84 In all three arenas the Rehnquist Court made neutrality
the central benchmark of constitutionality, but with markedly different
impacts on religious liberty.285 Whereas the focus on neutrality under free
speech and the Establishment Clauses enhanced religious liberty, the focus
judgment). She stated that free exercise rights are implicated any time government imposes a
burden on religious exercise, "whether the burden is imposed directly through laws that prohibit or
compel specific religious practices, or indirectly through laws that, in effect, make abandonment
of one's own religion or conformity to the religious beliefs of others the price of an equal place in
the civil community." Id. at 897. She concluded, however, that Oregon had a compelling interest
in not exempting the claimants from the state's prohibition of peyote use. See id. at 905-07.
279. Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated:
This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a consistent and exacting standard to
test the constitutionality of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion. Such a
statute may stand only if the law in general, and the State's refusal to allow a religious
exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less
restrictive means.
Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He proceeds to state that the majority avoids that longestablished standard only by "mischaracterizing this Court's precedents." Id. at 908. Unlike
Justice O'Connor, however, he concluded that the state did not have a compelling interest in not
granting an exemption for religious use of peyote in Native-American ceremonies. See id. at 920.
A large number of legal commentators have similarly argued that Smith greatly changed, and
substantially restricted, prior Free Exercise Clause doctrine. See, e.g., Vincent Martin Bonventre,
The Fall of Free Exercise: From "No Law" to Compelling Interests to Any Law Otherwise Valid,
70 ALB. L. REv. 1399, 1411-15 (2007); Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live
Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
850, 851 (2001) ("the Supreme Court cast aside almost three decades of free exercise
jurisprudence when it handed down its decision in Smith.")
280. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
281. The Court in Smith stated that a society such as ours that believes in religious freedom is
likely "to be solicitous" of that in the political process. Id. at 890.
282. For a rare example of such a case, decided by the Supreme Court three years after Smith,
see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
283. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 213-16.
285. See supra Parts I-I.A.
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on neutrality under free exercise diminished it.28 6 The clear result of the
Court's increasing reliance on concepts of neutrality was to shift protection
of religious liberty even more in the direction of free speech, where it had
long had a well-established home.28 7
In one important respect, however, the Court's focus on neutrality in
Smith was not complete, or at least not strict. Although making it clear that
states are not constitutionally required to accommodate religious concerns
in otherwise neutral and generally applicable laws, the Court was equally
clear that states were constitutionally permitted to accommodate religion by
granting religious adherents exemptions from such laws.288 Indeed, the
Court emphasized this point near the end of its opinion, stating that in a
society such as ours it is likely that legislatures will be "solicitous" of
religious needs 289 and granting such exemptions poses no Establishment
Clause problem.29 °
Recognizing the constitutional permissibility of religious exemptions,
though not the constitutional necessity, was an extremely important
dimension to Smith, 29 ' and one that provides the potential for meaningful
protection of religious liberty. In that regard, the Court was probably right;
legislatures will often be solicitous of the needs of the religious groups. 292
Yet from a constitutional perspective, the impact of Smith was dramatic,
making it clear that the Free Exercise Clause provided little protection to
religious exercise.293 Neutrality largely shifted the focus even more toward
free speech and away from free exercise. 294
III. WHAT THIS MIGHT MEAN
Let me conclude by briefly commenting on possible implications of the
Court's increasing reliance on free speech to protect religious liberty,
examining the issue from two perspectives: (1) what these cases say about
how the Court views the role of religion in American life; and (2) how the
Court's increasing focus on free speech, rather than free exercise, fits with
the challenges that both America as a nation and religion face in the twentyfirst century.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See supra Part II.
See supra Parts I-II.A.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 261-83.
See supra text accompanying notes 261-83.
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How the Court Views Religion

The Rehnquist Court's emphasis on neutrality, which emerges in its
free speech, free exercise, and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, has
resulted in an increased focus on free speech principles to protect religious
liberty.2 95 Rather than treating religion as unique, both in the threats
religion poses and in the protections it needs, neutrality tends to view
religion as similar to other influences, values and ideas in American
society.296 To be sure, the Court still sees religion as somewhat unique in
our constitutional order, as the existence of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses more or less require. 29' But the Court's increasing focus
on neutrality has tended to minimize that uniqueness, while shifting even
more of the protection for religious liberty to free speech.298
It is worth noting that this retooling of religious liberty took place
during a time of national discussion-debate, if you will-on the proper
role of religion in public life. That debate was precipitated largely, though
by no means exclusively, by the rise of the religious right, and concerned
not only religion's role in politics, but also in other public arenas. Much of
it concerned constitutional understandings of religion's role in society and
understandings of separation of church and state, but also broader
discussions of what the obligations of good citizenship requires in a liberal
democracy. 299 The discussion has generated a host of academic articles and
books, 300 but has also been prominent in the popular media.
At the risk of oversimplification, people tend to fall into one of two
groups regarding religion's role in America's public life. First, many
believe that religion should remain largely private and away from

295. See supra text accompanying notes 261-83.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
297. For example, the Court has continued to interpret the Establishment Clause to prohibit
government promotion of religion, especially in public schools. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). And although the
Court's decision in Smith greatly diminished the previous scope of protection under the Free
Exercise Clause, that clause still prohibits targeting religion for unique burdens.
298. See supra Part II.A.
299. See infra note 300.
300. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1997); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY,
LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991);
MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997);

Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993);
Douglas G. Smith, The Illiberalism of Liberalism: Religious Discourse in the Public Square, 34
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1571 (1997).
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America's public life. 301 This group, often employing the rhetoric of
separation of church and state, emphasizes the divisive nature of religion,
the Founders' concern about religious intolerance, and the inaccessibility of
religious values, which are derived through divine revelation rather than
rational discourse.30 2 This view sees religion as a potential threat to
American values when it leaves its private domain and enters the public
square. 303 In contrast, a second group has argued that religion should be
viewed as a full co-participant in America's public life, with the same
opportunity to influence the direction of this country as any other set of
values. 3° 4 This group does not see religion
as a threat to America's public
30 5
life, but rather as an important participant.
It is clear that the Rehnquist Court's view of religion largely conforms
to this second view. Rather than seeing religion as a threat to American
values, the Court's jurisprudence clearly sees religion as a full coparticipant in America's public life, to be received on the same terms as any
other world view or value system. 30 6 This general view of religion, which
clearly flows from the Rehnquist Court's religious speech cases,30 7 includes
the three following corollaries:
(1) religion is not intended to be merely a private affair, but has a
public dimension to it;
(2) religious views have the same right to influence society as any
other view; and
(3) as long as government treats religion equally and neutrally,
religion is not a danger or threat to society.
This, of course, differs dramatically from the views of those who
would privatize religion, but I believe is more in line with the Court's actual
view of religion's role in American society. To be sure, the Court remains
skeptical about government involvement in and promotion of religion, a
301. See infra notes 302-04.
302. See, e.g., Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic
Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 679-86 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion
Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473, 476-85 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
LiberalDemocracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197-201 (1992).
303. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 302, at 495.
304. See, e.g., RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 139-42 (2d ed. 1986); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:

CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 44 (1997); Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech
That Is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793, 798 (1996); Smith, supra note
300, at 1641.
305. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 300.
306. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1993).
307. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 393-94.
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position it has maintained consistently for a number of years.30 8 But it is
much more positive about religion per se and its role in American public
life. 30 9 In that context the Court views religion as a valued co-participant in
America's public life, with the same right to influence the direction of the
nation as any other belief or value system.3t °
This view of religion as co-participant in America's public life is
reflected in two aspects of the Rehnquist Court jurisprudence. First, by
characterizing the exclusion of religious speech as viewpoint
discrimination, the Court not only increased the level of protection given to
religious speech, 3 11 but saw that speech through a slightly different lens.
Rather than viewing the cases as merely excluding religion as a subject, the
Court consistently saw prohibitions on religious speech as excluding
religious views on various societal concerns: child-rearing, character and
From this perspective,
moral development, and social issues. 3 12
the
purpose
of discussing various
government is creating speech fora for
issues, and the impact of denying access to religious speech is to exclude
the religious viewpoint on those issues. 313 The Rehnquist Court made clear,
31 4
however, that religion has an equal right to participate in those debates.
The second way the Rehnquist Court strongly reinforced religion's
right to be a co-participant was by not allowing the Establishment Clause to
shut the door to religion's participation in such debates.3 15 Many people
latch on to the concept of separation of church and state as in fact
precluding religion's participation in broader societal discussions, at least to
the extent such discussion is taking place under the rubric of government
sponsorship, as in public schools. But the Court, by emphasizing a
neutrality analysis, eliminated the idea of the Establishment Clause as a
barrier, saying the Constitution's basic concerns are addressed by treating
308. The Court has long maintained that government itself should not promote or sponsor
religion, especially in public institutions like schools. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425
(1962) (at a minimum, the Establishment Clause means that "it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of
a religious program carried on by government"). The Court has maintained this strong stance
against government promotion of religion in recent years. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992).
309. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108-09; Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 394-95.
310. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 394.
311. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
312. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-11 (character and moral development);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (various societal issues); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94 (childrearing).
313. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
314. See id.
315. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
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religion the same as everyone else-in other words, allowing it to
participate on the same terms. 316 As mentioned before, there is a nice
symmetry here-the neutrality that is mandated by free speech also serves
to mitigate Establishment Clause concerns.
This symmetry centered on neutrality also aligns with one of the oldest
and most consistent theories supporting the constitutional value of free
speech: the marketplace of ideas. Under this theory the Free Speech Clause
serves to permit free and open debate in the search for truth. As stated by
the Court in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,317 this includes the
search for our cultural and political identity.3 1 This theory has its roots in
the writings of both John Milton and John Stuart Mill,3" 9 but became
entrenched in American free speech jurisprudence through the judicial
opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis. 320 The essence of
this theory is that our commitment to free speech involves a system where
all ideas can be tested on their own merits, with all being given equal entry
321
and none preferred status.
As stated by Holmes in his famous dissent in
322
States,
Abrams v. United
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
323
Constitution.

The Rehnquist Court's focus on neutrality in discussing religious
speech-as requiring entry into public debate under the Free Speech Clause
and not precluding entry into such debate under the Establishment Clause316. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-14; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839-41; Lamb's
Chapel,515 U.S. at 394-95; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981).

317. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
318. The Court stated:
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for
each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from
government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any
restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
Id. at 95-96 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
319. See SMOLLA, supra note 201.
320. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., and Holmes, J.,
concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., and Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
321. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., and Holmes, J., concurring); Abrams, 250
U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., and Brandeis, J., dissenting).
322. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
323. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J.,
and Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375
(Brandeis, J., and Holmes, J., concurring).
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reflects the marketplace concept. 324
This marketplace metaphor is
predicated on the constitutional understanding that all ideas, no matter what
their source, should have equal access to public debate and discussion, and
equal opportunity to influence the direction of public life.325 This
essentially is what the Rehnquist Court religious speech cases said-giving
religion equal access to the marketplace of ideas poses no problem under
the Establishment Clause, and free speech requires it.326

The people

themselves, rather than government, can judge the propriety and worth of
religious
perspectives on the issues constantly discussed in American public
7
life.

32

It should be noted, however, that the Rehnquist Court's view of
religion as full co-participant in America's public life came with a cost,
which was a significant loss of protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
As noted earlier, whereas a focus on neutrality tended to protect religion as
speech, the same emphasis on neutrality lessened protection under the Free
Exercise Clause. 8 Specifically, the Court's decision in Smith held that the
Free Exercise Clause is not violated as long as a law is neutral and of
general applicability, even if it results in an incidental yet substantial
burden on religious exercise.329 In other words, religion must take the bitter
with the sweet when it comes to being a co-participant in America's public
life.
Thus, religion during the Rehnquist era lost much of its unique status, a
unique status that to some would have limited its entry into public life, but
324. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 386, 394-95
(1993).

325. See, e.g., Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., and Brandeis, J., dissenting).
326. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 394.
327. The Court's emphasis on religion as a co-participant in influencing America's public life
also finds considerable support in another highly regarded theory of free speech, self-governance.
The self-governance theory is primarily associated with the work of Alexander Meiklejohn, who
argued that free speech is the essence of democracy and without it self-governance ceases to exist.
As stated by Meiklejohn, the purpose of free speech "is to give every voting member of the body
politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which the
citizen of a self-governing society must deal." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:

THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 (1965). Such a view requires that speech, as it
relates to the political process, be completely free of content discrimination:
[T]he vital point, as stated negatively, is that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a
hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather than another. And this means that...
citizens . . . may not be barred because their views are thought to be false or dangerous. No
plan of action shall be outlawed because someone in control thinks it unwise, unfair, unAmerican.... And the reason for this equality of status in the field of ideas lies deep in the
very foundations of the self-governing process. When men govern themselves, it is theyand no one else-who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948).
328. See supra text accompanying note 286.
329. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
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also a unique status that constitutionally provided protection when being a
participant in American society created unique burdens. In the same way
that neutrality guaranteed religion full access to America's public life and
societal debates, an access strongly supported by the underlying values of
free speech, so too did neutrality require that as a co-participant religion not
be constitutionally released from the obligations and burdens that being a
co-participant in America's public life brings. 33 ) The Court itself did not
view this as a substantial loss, since it anticipated the political process
would often release religion from substantial burdens that uniquely affect a
particular religion, 33 1 but from a constitutional perspective it was a
significant cost to pay.
In this sense the Rehnquist Court turned on its head some of the
arguments made by those who would privatize faith, who see the religion
clauses as creating a special balance or trade-off in which the Establishment
Clause places special limits on religious participation in public life in
exchange for special protections and exemptions granted to it under the
Free Exercise Clause. 332 For example, both Kathleen Sullivan and Abner
Greene have argued that the First Amendment contains an implicit balance,
where the Establishment Clause limits religion's public participation in
exchange for the special protections offered by Free Exercise, which
exempts religious adherents from some general obligations when
substantial burdens might exist. Greene puts it this way:
[T]he Free Exercise Clause can be seen as providing a political
counterweight to the Establishment Clause. If the latter should be read to
prevent law from being based expressly on religious faith, then the former
should be construed to make religious faith a ground for avoiding the
obligations of law. In other words, a religious person can justifiably say,
"You're keeping my religion out of your politics, now keep your politics
out of my religion."
Sullivan makes a similar argument, saying that the Establishment
Clause implicitly "establishes a civil public order" to ensure an end to
religious division.334 She states that "[t]he price of this truce is the
banishment of religion from the public square, but the reward should be
allowing religious subcultures to withdraw from regulation insofar as
compatible with peaceful diarchic coexistence. 33 5
330. See id. at 878-79.

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

See id. at 890.
See Greene, supra note 300, at 1634-35; Sullivan, supra note 302, at 222.
Greene, supra note 300, at 1634-35.
Sullivan, supra note 302, at 222.
Id.
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But the Rehnquist Court rejects this balance or symmetry, adopting a
more minimalist interpretation of the religion clauses.3 36 Whereas Sullivan,
Greene and others would give an expansive reach to the religion clauseswhat is prohibited under the Establishment Clause and what is protected
under Free Exercise-the Rehnquist Court narrows the reach of each, at
least in terms of religion's own participation in America's public life. 337 In
this sense religion is neither burdened with special disabilities under the
Establishment Clause nor granted special protection under Free Exercise,
opposite to the calculus suggested by Sullivan and Greene. 338 It was under
the Free Speech Clause that the Rehnquist Court gave substantial protection
to religious exercise, an approach very consistent with the view of religion
as co-participant, since its protection under free speech is the same as any
other speech.339 What the Rehnquist Court made clear is that religious
speech has the same basic speech rights as any other
view, most importantly
340
the right not to be excluded from public debate.
Even the Smith Court's willingness to permit special accommodations
for religion, just not require them, underscores this basic point. 34 1 Although
at first glance this might appear to be a special accommodation to religion,
it in fact reinforces the Rehnquist Court's minimalist approach to the
Establishment Clause.342 Whereas a strict neutrality approach might not
permit even legislative accommodations,3 43 the Rehnquist Court does not go
that far.
Although the neutral treatment of religion ensures the
Establishment Clause is not violated, in other words, it is a sufficient
condition, it is hardly a necessary one.344 In the same way that nonreligious groups may seek exemptions from legislative mandates, so may
religion. 345
As such, permitting but not requiring legislative
accommodations further reflects the Court's more minimalist approach to
the religion clauses, which in turn reflects its view of religion as co336. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 112-13 (2001); Smith, 494

U.S. at 878-79.
337. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
338. See Greene, supra note 300, at 1634-35; Sullivan, supra note 302, at 222.
339. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).

340. See id.
341. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
342. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13.
343. Scholars have at times drawn a distinction between formal neutrality, which would
prohibit any distinct treatment of religion, and substantive neutrality, which permits special
accommodations for religion so as to avoid coercive pressure on religious conduct. See, e.g.,
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999-1006 (1990).

344. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
345. See id.
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346
participant deserving of the same treatment as others.
This concept of religion as co-participant with equal rights and burdens
is far from complete, however, for in two important respects the religion
clauses continue to give religion a unique status. First, and most
importantly, the Establishment Clause prohibits government itself from
promoting religion.347 Whereas the Rehnquist Court was very positive
about religion per se and its role in American life, the Court remained very
348
skeptical about government involvement in and promotion of religion.
This attitude of skepticism was most apparent in the context of public
schools, where the Court drew a very rigid line against any government
349
promotion or sponsorship of religion, even in attenuated circumstances.
But in other contexts the Court similarly rejected government itself
promoting religion, making clear that the Establishment Clause continued
to place a substantial barrier to government sponsoring or promoting
religion.350
Second, even though the Rehnquist Court greatly limited the reach of
free exercise protection against incidental burdens on religion, it interpreted
the Free Exercise Clause as prohibiting laws that target religion for special
burdens.351
Such laws are very unusual, of course, but the Court's
interpretation nevertheless provides some additional protection to religion
that other groups might not have, This "anti-discrimination" dimension of
free exercise partially overlaps with protection under the free speech clause
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of speech content, including

346. See id.
347. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07, 112-13.
348. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305, 307-08 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-90 (1992).
349. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 305, 307-08; Lee, 505 U.S. at 587-90.
350. This has been the case in the religious symbolism cases, where government has religious
symbols on its property. The Court's jurisprudence in this area has been extremely confused, with
the Court inevitably fractured, but a majority has consistently taken the position that it violates the
Establishment Clause if government intends to promote or sponsor religion by the presence of
such symbols. Although some justices have no problem with religious symbols on government
property, the cases have typically turned on the context of the symbols and the perceptions
created. If the religious symbol is part of a broader secular display, it is allowed, but if standing
alone it is prohibited. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 679, 681 (2005) (display of Ten
Commandments on state capital grounds constitutional where simply part of a broader display);
McCreary County, Kentucky v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 850-51, 871-81 (2005)
(display of Ten Commandments in court building unconstitutional where context and sequence of
events indicated purpose was to promote religion); County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 492 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1989) (display of creche unconstitutional where context suggested
endorsement of Christianity, but display of Menorah constitutional where part of a broader secular
display celebrating holiday season).
351. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532-33
(1993).
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religious speech.352 But the Court's interpretation of free exercise
protection in
Smith would also prohibit targeting non-expressive religious
353
practices.

Therefore, the Rehnquist Court recognized that the religion clauses of
the First Amendment continue to provide religion with some degree of
unique status under the Constitution, as any reasonable interpretation of
those clauses must recognize.354 Yet, even these two vestiges of uniqueness
reinforce the idea of religion as co-participant in America's public life by
stating that government must neither prefer nor explicitly inhibit religion.355
The non-promotion view of the Establishment Clause does not prevent
religion from full participation in public affairs, it just requires that it do so
without the benefit of government sponsorship and promotion. 35 6 Similarly,
the free exercise prohibition on laws targeting religion for special
burdens 357 levels the playing field, again reflecting a vision of equal
participation in America's public life.

B.

How this Model Fits in the Twenty-First Century

A final question is how the Court's view of religion as a co-participant
in America's public life, with only limited prohibitions and protections, fits
with the challenges that both America and religion face in the twenty-first
century. Opinions will obviously differ to that question, with no clear
answer, and to some extent will simply turn on presuppositions regarding
whether religion should be kept private or not. But a few comments seem
in order.
First, in terms of America itself, the religion as speech model, with
religion as a co-participant in public affairs, fits in quite well with our
nation's landscape in the twenty-first century. As a practical matter, the
idea of public religion that participates in America's public life and
influences the direction our nation takes, even politically, has been the
model for most of our nation's history. 358 The Founders almost certainly
352. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07.
353. See Church ofthe Lukumi BabaluAye, 508 U.S. at 533.
354. See id. at 532-33.
355. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at
532.
356. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-14.
357. See Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, 508 U.S. at 532-33.
358. For discussions of the role religion has played in American politics at various stages of
our nation's history, see, e.g., RUTH H. BLOCH, VISIONARY REPUBLIC: MILLENNIAL THEMES IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT 1756-1800 passim (1985) (American revolution); DANIEL WALKER HOWE,
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contemplated that this would be the case, notwithstanding the dangers that
religious divisions posed to the new nation.359 The Establishment Clause
guarded against such divisions, not by banning religion from America's
public life, but by creating the idea of government itself being secular, one
that would neither establish nor promote religion. 360 This permitted religion
to participate in public affairs, including political activity, but precluded
government from promoting religious views.361
Such a vision for America, which essentially is that adopted by the
Rehnquist Court, seems equally suitable for today, if not more so. The
Founders anticipated religion's involvement in American public life and
politics notwithstanding the threat that religious divisions might pose to
political stability. 362 That threat was a very real danger in the minds of the
Founders, in particular because the religious wars that plagued Europe in
the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries were still a relatively recent event,
and one that demonstrated the painful consequences that religious conflict
is capable of producing.363 Yet we today are far removed from any such
dangers, and the American experiment itself has proved to be one that has
permitted religion's participation in America's public life without the threat
of political instability and even war. No one can make a serious argument
that those are even remote concerns today.
Moreover, the Rehnquist Court's view of religion as co-participant still
precludes government itself from promoting religion. 36
The types of
government-sponsored religion today pale in comparison to the types of
THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 150-80 (1979) (discussing the significant
influence of Evangelical though on Whig politics); Martin E. Marty, The Twentieth Century:
Protestants and Others, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS: FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO

THE 1980s 322, 322-33 (Mark A. Noll ed., 1990).
359. For example, in James Madison's celebrated Federalist No. 10, where he argues for the
advantages of a well-constructed union against the problem of political actions, Madison notes
that factions can be addressed either by removing its causes or by controlling its effects. He
rejects the former as sacrificing liberty, or prescribing a cure worse than the disease. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison asserted
that the proper solution is found not in removing the causes of factions, but in controlling their
effects through a representative form of government. See id. at 80-84. Significantly, Madison
identified religion as one of several possible sources of political factions. See id. at 79.
360. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
361. For an elaboration of this argument, see Mark W. Cordes, Politics,Religion, and the First
Amendment, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 111, 127-42 (2000).
362. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 359, at 77-78, 80-84.
363. For example, James Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, considered one of the most important documents on the concerns giving rise to the
Establishment Clause, made several references to the religious wars of Europe as a reason to avoid
a blending of church and state. See MADISON, supra note 156, at 300-03.
364. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305, 307-08 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-90 (1992).
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government-sponsored religion in earlier eras, which included officially
established churches, requiring religious oaths for office, and levying
special taxes to support churches. 365 Today the Court is typically
confronted with modest efforts to promote religion in school,366 and various
sorts of religious symbolism on government property, such as nativity
scenes and displays of the Ten Commandments.36 7 These are serious issues,
to be sure, but are a far cry from how government promoted religion in
earlier periods.368 Yet even here the Supreme Court has drawn a relatively
bright and rigid line against government promotion and endorsement of
religion. 369 The Rehnquist Court in particular made that line rigid, rejecting
even tenuous efforts to promote prayer in school.37 °
Thus, the Rehnquist Court's view of religion in public life poses very
little threat to American governance or political values. At the same time it
is very consistent with our society's commitment to political equality and
freedom of speech, where ideas are tested in the marketplace and accepted
or rejected by their intuitive appeal. 37' This certainly has been the dominant
philosophy of the Supreme Court 372 and, in most people's minds, been one
that has generally worked well for our nation. 373 Religion as co-participant
fits well into this mainstream and arguably is a natural and even inevitable
consequence of it. Most importantly, it poses no danger to our governance,
political stability, or national identity, and seems to enhance, rather than
detract from the core American values of equality and individual liberty.
Those who would privatize faith, however, have often argued that
inclusion of religious values and argument are inconsistent with the
understandings of a liberal democracy such as the United States, especially

365. See ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 78-82 (1964) (detailing the array of church-state contacts that existed at the time Federal
Constitution was drafted); see also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-77 (1986).

366. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 294; Lee, 505 U.S. at 580.
367. See supra note 350.
368. See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 365.
369. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 305, 307-08; Lee, 505 U.S. at 587-90; Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962); supra note 350.
370. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 305, 307-08; Lee, 505 U.S. at 587-90; Engel,
370 U.S. at 425.

371. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 386, 394-95
(1993); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).

372. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-95; Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96
(1972); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., and Holmes, J.,
concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., and Brandeis, J.,

dissenting).
373. See, e.g., supra note 327.
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at this stage of our nation's history.374 In particular, some have argued that
liberal democratic ideals of respect and equal treatment of others requires
that public policy be based only on commonly shared principles that are
"accessible" to others, and that people should not have their freedom
limited by principles that are largely "inaccessible" or not understood by
them. 37 5 At the heart of this inaccessibility argument is the idea that
religious understanding is epistemologically different from other
knowledge, and especially knowledge obtained by secular reasoning.376
Religious values are based on faith, not reason, and therefore cannot be
understood by others who have not been enlightened by such faith.3 77 As
such, it precludes others from understanding the basis on which decisions
are made, in a way or at least to a degree that rational discourse does not,
and therefore does not fit into the marketplace of ideas in the same way as
other speech contents.378 Some have argued that for these reasons the
Founders intended that religion be private, 379 not a co-participant in
America's public life. But to many the accessibility issue is particularly
compelling today, where America is far more diverse and society itself is
far more secular.
The above "accessibility" argument, although intuitively appealing on
one level, has two basic problems. First, as argued by Scott Idleman, the
argument is overbroad since rcligious knowledge and values are not
completely inaccessible to nonadherents. 380 Putting aside the possibility of
conversion, which might not be viewed as a realistic option, many religious
norms are accessible to some degree to nonadherents. This is particularly
true of Christian faith, which is by far the largest religion in this country
and the one most likely to influence public life. 381 Christian knowledge,
beliefs and values are generally not based on direct and individualistic
communications from God to believers, but on tradition, natural law, and
most importantly scripture. The nonadherent can equally examine and seek
374. See Greene, supra note 300, at 1623.
375. See GREENAWALT, supra note 300; THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 16164 (1991); Greene, supra note 300, at 1620-23; Sherry, supra note 302, at 478-89; see also BRUCE
A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 345-48 (1980).

376. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 300, at 1623.
377. See, e.g., id. (permitting religious norms in lawmaking would exclude nonbelievers, since
they would "lack access to the source of normative authority that is offered as the basis for the law
they are told to obey").
378. See, e.g., id. Contra Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
379. See Sherry, supra note 302, at 483-89.
380. See Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation:A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory
ofthe Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 344-48.

381. Christianity

Today

-

General

Statistics

and

Facts

of Christianity

Today,

http://christianity.about.com/od/denominations/p/christiantoday.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2008).

SOUTHWESTERN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

to understand such sources and debate their meanings. 382 This might take
substantial work, but that is no different than understanding any other
competing world view.
Moreover, even for those not inclined to study sacred texts and
traditions, religious views often reflect values and principles easily
understood and responded to by others. For example, a Christian might
oppose euthanasia because the Bible teaches the worth and dignity of
human life. Presented at that level, and religious views often are,
nonadherents can both understand the concept and respond to it, engaging
in discussion of why the concept of the "worth and dignity of human life"
might lead to opposition or support of euthanasia. Indeed, on a host of
issues, including poverty, national security, environmental protection, racial
discrimination, the economy and others, the Bible is interpreted not as
stating specific answers but providing general principles of guidance,
principles which are usually quite accessible to nonadherents.383 None of
this is meant to suggest that religious knowledge is fully accessible to those
outside the faith; it clearly is not. But it does demonstrate that the
inaccessibility argument is overstated, and that religious understandings are
accessible to others, at least in the same way that many other perspectives
are accessible.
This leads to the second, and more significant problem with the
inaccessibility argument which is that it is also underinclusive. By that I
simply mean that secular beliefs suffer from the same accessibility problem
and are, for the most part, equally inaccessible as religious beliefs. In the
final analysis, religious values are epistemologically no different than
secular beliefs-both are ultimately grounded in unproveable presumptions,
accepted as a matter of faith. Although secular beliefs are often veiled in a
way religious claims are not, the result is the same: religious and
nonreligious views involve a comparable epistemological process to arrive
at an ultimate conclusion, with neither in and of themselves able to establish
an epistemological high ground.
This point has been made by a number of critics of those who seek to
privatize faith. Idleman writes:
[C]onsider the presumptive equality or intrinsic worth of all human
beings-the very cornerstone of modem civil rights. As a normative
starting point, this presumption is widely shared and largely not open to
debate for a majority of people in the United States today. Yet, can such a
starting point actually be derived from "human experience" alone? The
answer is emphatically no. At some point, one or more nonprovable
382. See Idleman, supra note 380, at 344-46.
383. Id. at 344-45.
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384
normative propositions must enter the calculus.

Others have also noted that all secular forms of reasoning designed to
arrive at proper judgments, political or otherwise, ultimately rest on
nonprovable normative assumptions, accepted in a manner of faith similar
to the ways religious beliefs might be. 385 These are, of course, often
unstated, creating the appearance of being epistemologically different, when
in fact they are not.386 As Larry Alexander puts it, there is no
"epistemological divide" between religious and other value systems in a
liberal democracy. 387 Any attempts to exclude religious discourse and
values from being a co-participant in influencing America's public life
because they are not subject to reasoned assessment would equally discredit
any other value system.
What Alexander, Idleman, and others have shown is that religious
values and secular values are ultimately grounded in the same way. 388 It is
true that with secular value systems these are often unspoken first premises,
yet that does not change the reality that their way of "knowing" is not on
some epistemological high ground. At the same time it needs to be
emphasized that religious value systems, though obviously grounded in
elements of faith, almost always also involve deliberation and reasoning to
form their views. 389 Both religious and secular ways of thinking employ
elements of deliberation and reason, yet each involves "leaps of faith" at
various points. 390
Therefore, the argument that because religion is
epistemologically different it should be more private and kept away from
public affairs fails. That argument was false at the time of our nation's
founding, and continues to be false in the twenty-first century, even in the
context of a decidedly secular culture. The Supreme Court's view of
religion as co-participant 391 fits in very well with who we have been as a
nation and who we will continue to be in the future.
For all these reasons the Rehnquist Court's view of religion as coparticipant in America's public life, with only limited special prohibitions
and protections, 392 fits quite well with America in the twenty-first century.
384. Id. at 349.
385. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 763, 775 (1993).
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See Alexander, supra note 385, at 768-69.
See Idleman, supra note 380, at 349.
See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Lamb's
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Such a vision poses very little, if any threat, to America's constitutional and
political order, and, if anything, supports it. Whatever influence religion
might have in its role as co-participant is up to religion itself and its
inherent worth, the same as in any other set of ideas and values in the
marketplace of ideas.
A second question is whether the Rehnquist Court's view of religion
fits in with the challenges religion itself will face in the twenty-first century.
This is a much different matter, and one for which no clear answer exists.
Each religion is unique and manifests itself, both privately and publicly, in
different ways. Despite growing religious diversity, the United States
remains overwhelmingly Christian, but even here Christian denominations
vary considerably.3 93 For these reasons assessing whether the Rehnquist
Court's view of religion fits with the challenges religion will face in this
century, or even what those challenges will be, is a difficult if not
impossible task.
Having said that, it might be argued that the Rehnquist Court's view of
religion as co-participant in America's public life fits in relatively well with
many of the challenges religion now faces and will face in the future. For a
substantial part of our nation's history, religious liberty faced two primary
threats-government attempts to interfere with religion and government
attempts to establish or promote religion. 394 Although both concerns remain
to some extent today, neither one poses the substantial threat that it did in
the past. This is largely a result of our nation's increased sensitivity to
religious diversity and tolerance on the one hand, and the extent to which
the ideal of separation of church and state has been engrained in the
American consciousness on the other.
For example, although government interference with religion still
395
occurs, it is attenuated compared to previous periods in our history.
There are few instances today where government intentionally interferes
with religion; 396 our societal emphasis on toleration and diversity precludes
that for the most part. The more likely type of interference occurs from
general laws which have incidental, yet substantial burdens on religion,
such as occurred in Smith. 397 Even here, however, our societal emphasis on
tolerance and respect for religious diversity make it likely that legislation
393. Comparing Christian Denominations - Statistics: Geography, http://christianity.about.
com/od/denominationscomparison/ss/statisticschart_4.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2008).
394. See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 365.
395. Id.
396. Exceptions to that principle occasionally occur. For an example of a rare instance where
a local government intentionally interfered with religion, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524-28 (1993).

397. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
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itself will accommodate unique religions, an option that the Smith Court
3 98
said was permissible and consistent with the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, after Smith the399
state of Oregon itself passed an exemption for the
religious use of peyote.
Similarly, concerns about government promotion of religion, though
certainly very real today, are but a shadow of what they were in earlier
periods of American history. 400 There are no serious efforts to establish
official state churches, as existed at our founding and for several decades
thereafter, nor efforts to recognize Christianity as our official religion, as
periodically occurred throughout the nineteenth century. 40 1 Even efforts to
pass a serious constitutional prayer amendment have largely run out of gas,
and the type of civil religion that government identifies with is so void of
meaningful substance as to not make it a threat to anyone. Even the
religion in public school issues that continue to plague the courts, and will
undoubtedly do so for years to come, today tend to be quite nuanced and at
the margins, a far cry from the earlier cases of children reciting statecomposed prayers.40 2 And, as noted earlier, the Rehnquist Court's view of
religion as co-participant continues to guard against any minor attempts to
promote religion.40 3
What is likely to be the real challenge for religion in the twenty-first
century is government and societal efforts to privatize religion. As
suggested above, American society has certainly reached the point where it
respects, or at least tolerates, a variety of religious faiths, and is not only not
going to deliberately interfere with any, but will take affirmative steps to
accommodate them.40 4 At the same time, however, there is a growing sense
on the part of many people that religion is and should remain a private
matter, and in particular kept away from influencing America's public
life. 40 5 This is in part a result of the growing dichotomy in the twentieth
century between a highly religious people and an increasingly secular
culture, with American cultural values being less and less influenced by the
398. See id. at 890.
399. See Garrett Epps, The Story of Al Smith: The First Amendment Meets Grandfather
Peyote, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 477, 500 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
400. See STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 365.
401. For a discussion of various efforts in the nineteenth century to recognize Christianity as
our official religion, see ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE,
CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 131-49 (1996).
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402. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
403. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305, 307-08 (2000); Lee v.
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religious values of its people.4 °6 As a consequence, many people believe
that religion, though important, should be a private matter. 40 7 This
perception finds reinforcement in misunderstandings of the Establishment
Clause and the related idea of separation of church and state.
This growing movement to privatize religion has been welldocumented by others, with perhaps the leading voices being Richard John
Neuhaus and Stephen Carter. Neuhaus's 1983 book, The Naked Public
Square,408 detailed and discussed the growing tendency to privatize faith in
this country, to make the public square devoid of religious influence. 40 9 A
decade later Carter repeated this theme in The Culture of Disbelief,41 ° using
the phrase "God as a hobby" to describe societal attitudes toward religion:
religion is fine as long as it is kept to yourself.411 Central to both writers is
concerns
the idea that society sees religion as irrelevant to broader societal
412
and is increasingly excluding religion from the public square.
Even if Neuhaus's and Carters's claims are a bit overstated, their basic
point has validity: there is a growing sense in this country that religion
should be a private matter. It is perhaps displayed most prominently in the
current debate over the role of religion in politics, with many people
suggesting it is inappropriate for people of faith to bring their religious
values into the political arena. But it is also seen in the types of cases the
Rehnquist Court reviewed, in which government created a forum for speech
but excluded religious speech.4 03
In this context I believe that the Court's growing emphasis on free
speech jurisprudence is particularly appropriate for the challenges religion
itself will face in this new century, because it addresses what might well be
the primary threat to religious liberty: efforts to privatize religion, resulting

406. Starting at mid-century, a number of historians and social commentators began
commenting on the twentieth century dichotomy of a highly religious people within a growing
secular culture. For example, prominent theologian Reinhold Neibuhr characterized America as
"at once the most religious and the most secular of nations." BARRY A. KOSMAN & SEYMOUR P.
LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 48
(1993) (quoting Neibuhr).

407. See Greene, supra note 300, at 1634-35; Sullivan, supra note 302, at 222.
408. NEUHAUS, supra note 304.
409. See id.
410. STEVEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).

411. Seeid. at23.
412. See id.; NEUHAUS, supra note 304.
413. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23
(1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 386, 394 (1993); supra
text accompanying notes 93-100.
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in discrimination against religion in public life.4 14 Not only is free speech
doctrine well-designed to protect against the specific types 4of15
discrimination that might take place, as seen in the school forum cases,
but it also sets a tone and communicates a broader message to society, that
religion should be viewed as a full co-participant in America's public
life.4 16 It serves as a reminder of who we are as a people and the
constitutional commitments that we embrace, which include a commitment
to treat all value systems, including religious ones, with equal respect and
dignity.

CONCLUSION

Protection of religious liberty and the development of free speech
doctrine have long been intertwined, dating back to the 1930's and 1940's
when modem free speech jurisprudence began to emerge.417 The central
role of free speech jurisprudence in protecting religious liberty came to full
fruition in the Rehnquist Court years, however, when the Court adopted a
strong neutrality analysis for religion issues.418 While this focus on
neutrality resulted in diminished protection under the Free Exercise Clause,
it solidified the protection given religion under free speech.4 19 In particular,
in a series of cases the Court consistently characterized exclusion of
religious speech from public speech fora as viewpoint discrimination,
thereby providing religious speech the highest protection possible. 420 At the
same time, the Court consistently held that the neutral treatment of religious
speech avoided any Establishment Clause concerns, even in contexts which
the Court has traditionally considered highly sensitive.4 2'
This "religion as speech" approach, with its emphasis on neutrality,422
fits well with the twenty-first century. It views religion as being a full coparticipant in America's public life, being received on the same terms as
any other value system. 423 Such an approach poses no threat to American
414. See Greene, supra note 300, at 1634-35; Sullivan, supra note 302, at 222.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
416. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Lamb's
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94.
417. See supra Part I.
418. See supra Part II.
419. See supra Part II.A.
420. See supra Part II.A.
421. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 395.
422. See supra Part II.
423. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Lamb's
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governance or political values, and seems to enhance, rather than detract
from the core American values of equality and individual liberty.424 It also
is well positioned to face many of the challenges religion itself faces in this
new century, which are more likely to arise from efforts to privatize
religious faith than to interfere with it. 425 Free speech jurisprudence makes
clear, however, that religion must be afforded the same opportunities to
participate in the discussions and debates of American public life.426
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